{
  "feature_id": "POS-001",
  "agent": "security",
  "stage": "security_gate",
  "verdict": "APPROVED",
  "reviewed_at": "2026-08-21T19:30:30Z",
  "summary": "Discovery-only phase. No code changes, no schema changes, no auth changes. The 5 documents describe future changes; security has reviewed the proposed shape and identified key safeguards that must be implemented in later phases.",
  "checks": [
    {
      "item": "No code or schema changes in this phase",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "git diff shows only new files under docs/pos/ and new tickets in backlog/features.json; project/src/ and project/migrations/ untouched"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future sale creation flow reuses existing auth + RBAC",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_API.md §7.1 — POST /pos/sales requires role in [pos_cashier, pos_manager, admin]; backend authenticate + requireRole pattern preserved"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future idempotency_key prevents double-charge on retry",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_API.md §7.1 — idempotency_key column already UNIQUE in orders_orders; same key returns same order (HTTP 200, not 201)"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future sale flow is transactional (atomicity)",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_ARCHITECTURE.md §3.3 + POS_API.md §7.1 — pricing, reservation, order creation, payments, stock confirmation all run in a single PG transaction with rollback on error"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future no PAN/CVV storage commitment documented",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_OPERATIONS.md §7 + POS_HARDWARE.md §5 — POS app never stores PAN/CVV/PIN; auth codes (vendor-issued references) stored in payments_transactions.raw"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future permission granularity addressed (POS_* permissions)",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_ARCHITECTURE.md §3.7 + POS_OPERATIONS.md §3 — new roles pos_cashier, pos_manager; requireRole extended to requireAnyRole + requirePermission helpers in shared/auth.ts"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future audit logging defined for every sensitive action",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_DATA_MODEL.md §7 — 11 stable action keys for store, terminal, session, sale, refund, discount, cancel, parked ticket actions; all use existing AuditLogger port"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future rate limits designed to prevent scanner-spam DoS",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_API.md §14 — POST /pos/sales: 60/min/user; search: 600/min/user; sessions: 6/hour/terminal; uses existing security.RateLimiter"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future walk-in customer model documented with DB-level constraints",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_DATA_MODEL.md §3.3 — orders_orders.user_id becomes nullable; CHECK constraint restricts NULL to POS sales only; existing customer table reused when customer is associated"
    },
    {
      "item": "Future hardware vendor-neutrality enforced",
      "ok": true,
      "evidence": "POS_HARDWARE.md §9 — explicit rule: zero vendor imports in apps/pos/ or project/src/modules/pos/; vendor SDKs only in shared/hardware/native/<vendor>/ added per vendor only when operator commits"
    }
  ],
  "issues": [],
  "notes": "No code in this phase to attack. The proposed architecture passes the security review. Future phases (POS-002 onwards) will require their own security reviews as code is written. Specific things to watch in Phase 2+: (a) cookie domain strategy must preserve Secure+HttpOnly; (b) idempotency_key collision risk if the POS UI generates non-UUID keys; (c) discount overrides must be rate-limited; (d) walk-in customers must not be linkable to other sales via shared session."
}
