# Architect — F-005 Identity: register, login, sessions

done -> work/artifacts/F-005/architect.md

## Deliverables
- specs/F-005-identity/SPEC.md, DESIGN.md, TASKS.md, TESTS.md

## Key decisions
1. **Server-side opaque sessions in PostgreSQL**, never JWT/client-trusted tokens:
   the cookie carries 512 bits of randomness; the DB stores only the SHA-256 hash.
   A DB leak yields no usable sessions; logout is a real revocation.
2. **Hexagonal identity module** (domain/application/infrastructure/api) as the ticket
   demands. Domain knows no framework; ports live in domain; infra implements them.
   This module is the template for catalog/inventory/orders later.
3. **argon2id with OWASP 2024 params** (m=19456 KiB, t=2, p=1) behind a PasswordHasher
   port. Timing equalization via dummy-hash verify on unknown email.
4. **Rate limiting behind a LoginRateLimiter interface**, in-memory implementation for
   the single-instance monolith: 10 consecutive failures per email, 15-min cooldown,
   reset on success, Retry-After on 429. Redis-backed swap later without touching use cases.
5. **Cookie policy**: HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax always; Secure via `COOKIE_SECURE`
   (default true — production-safe; .env.example sets false for local http).
6. **Foundation touchpoints kept minimal**: createPool(connectionString), COOKIE_SECURE
   in config, buildApp gains optional pool dep (foundation-only app preserved when absent).

## Security posture
- No plaintext or reversible passwords anywhere (argon2 PHC strings only).
- Generic 401 for both unknown email and wrong password (no enumeration).
- Parameterized SQL only; citext unique email enforced in DB (race-safe).
- Session expiry + revocation enforced in the DB query, not in app memory.

## Risks
- argon2 native build (toolchain verified present; fallback @node-rs/argon2 behind port).
- In-memory limiter is per-instance (documented; acceptable for monolith slice).
