feat(F-187): completed feature

work/artifacts/F-187/architect.md

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# F-187 — Architecture
+
+## Decision
+
+Model cashier removal as an account lifecycle on `backoffice_users`; never delete the row referenced by POS history.
+
+Migration `055_pos_cashier_lifecycle.js` adds:
+
+- `active boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true`
+- `deactivated_at timestamptz NULL`
+- `deleted_at timestamptz NULL`
+- consistency check: deleted implies inactive; active implies no lifecycle timestamps
+- index over POS cashier role/status
+
+Existing accounts remain active. Down removes only lifecycle columns/index/check.
+
+## Semantics
+
+| Action | Result | Reversible | Sessions |
+|---|---|---:|---|
+| Deactivate | `active=false`, `deactivated_at=now()` | yes | revoke all |
+| Reactivate | `active=true`, timestamps null | yes, unless deleted | remain revoked |
+| Delete | `active=false`, `deleted_at=now()` | no | revoke all |
+
+Delete is a tombstone rather than physical SQL deletion. The UUID and email remain available to historical receipt/session/reporting joins. Deleted cashiers are returned by the admin list with status `deleted`, but cannot be mutated again.
+
+Only rows whose current role is `pos_cashier` can be targeted. Managers, editors and administrators remain out of scope.
+
+## API
+
+All endpoints use backoffice authentication and `requireRole(admin)`.
+
+- `GET /pos/users`: existing endpoint gains `active`, `deactivatedAt`, `deletedAt`, `status`; remains POS staff list-compatible.
+- `POST /pos/users`: existing creation contract; lifecycle defaults active.
+- `PATCH /pos/users/:id/status` body `{ "active": boolean }`: deactivate/reactivate cashier.
+- `DELETE /pos/users/:id`: irreversible soft deletion, HTTP 204.
+
+Errors:
+
+- `POS_CASHIER_NOT_FOUND` (404): target absent or not `pos_cashier`.
+- `POS_CASHIER_HAS_OPEN_SESSION` (409): close register first.
+- `POS_CASHIER_DELETED` (409): attempted status change on tombstone.
+- `POS_CASHIER_ALREADY_DELETED` (409): repeat deletion.
+
+Mutations use a transaction and lock the cashier row `FOR UPDATE`. They check open cash sessions before lifecycle mutation, revoke `backoffice_sessions`, and append `pos.cashier.deactivated`, `pos.cashier.reactivated` or `pos.cashier.deleted` to `security_audit_log` in the same transaction.
+
+## Race safety
+
+`PgCashSessionRepository.open` must also lock the target `backoffice_users` row inside its transaction and require `active=true AND deleted_at IS NULL` before inserting. This serializes cash-session opening against deactivation/deletion:
+
+- open wins: lifecycle mutation sees the open session and returns 409;
+- lifecycle wins: opening sees inactive/deleted and fails.
+
+## Authentication
+
+Defense in depth at both entry paths:
+
+- `PgBackofficeUserRepository.findByEmail` only returns active, non-deleted accounts, so login gives the existing generic invalid-credentials response.
+- `createBackofficeSessionAuthenticator` includes the same lifecycle predicate, so sessions are invalid even before revocation completes and after database restore/races.
+- combined authentication inherits the backoffice check.
+
+No account-state detail is exposed by login.
+
+## Admin UI
+
+Add a **Cajeros** section to the TPV admin page:
+
+- create form (email/password) fixed to `pos_cashier`;
+- table with email, status and creation date;
+- active: Deactivate + Delete;
+- inactive: Reactivate + Delete;
+- deleted: no mutation actions;
+- native explicit confirmations name the cashier and explain open-register/history behavior.
+
+The admin page reloads cashier state independently from store-scoped terminal/payment configuration.
+
+## Tests
+
+PostgreSQL integration coverage:
+
+1. migration defaults existing cashier active;
+2. non-admin receives 403;
+3. deactivation revokes sessions and blocks authentication/login lookup;
+4. reactivation works without restoring revoked sessions;
+5. open cash session blocks deactivation and deletion;
+6. deletion keeps the same cashier row and historical `pos_cash_sessions.user_id` join;
+7. deleted cashier cannot reactivate;
+8. non-cashier target behaves as not found;
+9. migration up/no-op/down/up remains green.
+
+Targeted typecheck/build covers admin UI contract.

work/artifacts/F-187/documenter.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# F-187 — Documentation
+
+Updated `docs/pos/POS_CHECKOUT.md` with:
+
+- cashier active/inactive/deleted semantics;
+- session revocation and fresh-login behavior;
+- irreversible soft deletion and historical-attribution guarantee;
+- mandatory cash-session close before removal;
+- admin lifecycle API endpoints and role restrictions;
+- audit event behavior.
+
+Removed F-187 from the future-work list now that the lifecycle is implemented.

work/artifacts/F-187/implementer.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# F-187 — Implementer evidence
+
+## Delivered
+
+- Added reversible migration `055_pos_cashier_lifecycle.js` with active/deactivated/deleted account lifecycle, consistency constraint and cashier status index.
+- Extended backoffice domain roles to include POS manager/cashier and lifecycle fields.
+- Blocked inactive/deleted accounts in both credential lookup and live session authentication.
+- Made cash-session opening transactional and serialized against lifecycle mutation using the same `backoffice_users ... FOR UPDATE` row lock.
+- Extended admin-only POS user list with lifecycle status.
+- Added admin-only cashier activate/deactivate and soft-delete endpoints.
+- Lifecycle mutations reject open cash sessions, revoke every live session, preserve the cashier row/UUID and write an atomic security audit event.
+- Added TPV admin cashier UI for create, status display, confirmed deactivate/reactivate and irreversible deletion.
+- Added real PostgreSQL integration coverage in `pos-cashier-lifecycle.itest.ts`.
+
+## Validation
+
+- Backend typecheck: PASS.
+- Admin typecheck: PASS.
+- Backend production build: PASS.
+- Admin production build: PASS (only pre-existing Turbopack upload tracing warnings).
+- Targeted ESLint for every changed TypeScript/TSX file: PASS.
+- Prettier for every changed source/migration/test file: PASS.
+- POS unit tests: 12/12 PASS.
+- Full unit suite without DB: 268/268 PASS.
+- F-187 PostgreSQL integration: 4/4 PASS.
+- Full real-PostgreSQL sequential suite: 354/354 PASS across 79 files.
+- Migration fresh up / second no-op / full down / re-up: 4/4 PASS.
+- `git diff --check`: PASS.
+- `./scripts/verify.sh`: PASS.
+
+## Repository baseline notes
+
+- Full backend lint remains red on 9 pre-existing errors in thumbnail script, log broadcaster, an old POS test, and reporting files; all F-187 changed files pass targeted ESLint and Prettier.
+- Boundary check retains the single pre-existing security-module import violation; F-187 adds no module-boundary violation.
+- Full admin lint has zero errors and 23 pre-existing warnings.
+- Existing untracked upload JPGs were not touched.

work/artifacts/F-187/leader-close.json

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{
+  "feature_id": "F-187",
+  "agent": "leader",
+  "stage": "close",
+  "verdict": "APPROVED",
+  "checks": [
+    { "item": "reviewer/security/qa gates APPROVED", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "354/354 tests with real PostgreSQL sequential", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "migration up/no-op/down/up", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "backend and admin typecheck/build", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "targeted changed-file lint and formatting", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "verify.sh final exit 0", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "operator/API documentation updated", "ok": true }
+  ],
+  "issues": [],
+  "notes": [
+    "Unrelated upload JPGs are excluded from the feature commit.",
+    "Global backend lint debt and one security boundary violation predate F-187; changed files are clean."
+  ]
+}

work/artifacts/F-187/qa.json

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+  "feature_id": "F-187",
+  "agent": "qa",
+  "stage": "qa_gate",
+  "verdict": "APPROVED",
+  "acceptance": [
+    { "id": 1, "criterion": "Admin TPV lists cashier lifecycle status", "ok": true, "evidence": "GET /pos/users real-DB assertion and admin status badges" },
+    { "id": 2, "criterion": "Admin creates active cashier", "ok": true, "evidence": "Fixed-role create form and server default/response active" },
+    { "id": 3, "criterion": "Deactivate and reactivate non-deleted cashier", "ok": true, "evidence": "PATCH lifecycle integration assertions" },
+    { "id": 4, "criterion": "Deactivate revokes and blocks current/future auth", "ok": true, "evidence": "DB revoked_at, old-cookie 401 and login 401 assertions" },
+    { "id": 5, "criterion": "Confirmed deletion is irreversible", "ok": true, "evidence": "Explicit UI warning, DELETE 204 and reactivation 409" },
+    { "id": 6, "criterion": "Open cash session blocks removal", "ok": true, "evidence": "PATCH and DELETE both return POS_CASHIER_HAS_OPEN_SESSION" },
+    { "id": 7, "criterion": "Historical attribution survives deletion", "ok": true, "evidence": "Post-delete join keeps cashier ID through pos_cash_sessions" },
+    { "id": 8, "criterion": "Admin-only and cashier-role-only", "ok": true, "evidence": "Cashier list 403 and manager target 404" },
+    { "id": 9, "criterion": "Migration reversible with active default", "ok": true, "evidence": "Fresh/no-op/down/re-up 4/4 and inserted accounts default active" },
+    { "id": 10, "criterion": "Regression and builds green", "ok": true, "evidence": "354/354 real-DB tests, typechecks, backend/admin builds, verify.sh" }
+  ],
+  "regression": {
+    "unit_without_db": "268 passed",
+    "pos_unit": "12 passed",
+    "f187_real_postgresql": "4 passed",
+    "real_postgresql_sequential": "354 passed across 79 files",
+    "migration_cycle": "4 passed",
+    "backend_build": "passed",
+    "admin_build": "passed",
+    "verify": "passed"
+  },
+  "issues": [],
+  "notes": [
+    "Production admin UI was compile/type/lint validated; no browser automation harness exists for native confirm dialogs.",
+    "Backend global lint baseline remains red outside changed files; targeted F-187 lint is green."
+  ]
+}

work/artifacts/F-187/reviewer.json

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+  "feature_id": "F-187",
+  "agent": "reviewer",
+  "stage": "review_gate",
+  "verdict": "APPROVED",
+  "checks": [
+    { "item": "Soft deletion preserves backoffice user UUID and historical joins", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Lifecycle check constraint permits only coherent active/inactive/deleted states", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Login lookup and live session authentication both reject unavailable accounts", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Deactivation/deletion revokes sessions in the lifecycle transaction", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Cash-session opening and lifecycle mutations serialize on the same user row lock", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Open cash sessions block deactivation/deletion", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Only admin can mutate and only pos_cashier rows can be targeted", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Lifecycle audit event is atomic with each successful mutation", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Admin UI exposes explicit statuses and confirmations", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Migration, integration regression, typecheck and builds pass", "ok": true }
+  ],
+  "issues": [],
+  "notes": [
+    "Deleted cashier email is intentionally retained and remains unique to keep historical receipts human-readable; recreating the same address is not supported.",
+    "Manager/editor/admin lifecycle remains out of F-187 scope."
+  ]
+}

work/artifacts/F-187/security.json

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+  "feature_id": "F-187",
+  "agent": "security",
+  "stage": "security_gate",
+  "verdict": "APPROVED",
+  "checks": [
+    { "item": "Cashier list/create/status/delete require admin role", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Mutation lookup is restricted to pos_cashier targets", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Every lifecycle input and UUID is schema validated", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "All lifecycle SQL uses bound parameters", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Deactivation/deletion revokes all live sessions atomically", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Authenticator independently rejects inactive/deleted users", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Credential lookup preserves generic anti-enumeration failure", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Cash-session opening race is serialized by row lock", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Open-register guard prevents abandoning accountable cash", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Security audit events record actor/action/target atomically", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Changed-diff secret scan", "ok": true },
+    { "item": "Backend and admin production dependency audit", "ok": true }
+  ],
+  "dependency_audit": {
+    "backend": "0 vulnerabilities",
+    "admin": "0 vulnerabilities"
+  },
+  "issues": [],
+  "notes": [
+    "Soft deletion intentionally retains cashier email for human-readable historical attribution; this is account removal, not a personal-data erasure workflow.",
+    "No user-supplied audit metadata is accepted."
+  ]
+}